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The Transformative Effects of Public-Private Partnerships in
Cleveland:  An Inside View of Good Government under 
Mayors George Voinovich and Frank Jackson
Vera Vogelsang-Coombs
William M. Denihan
Melanie F. Baur
This paper is a revision of an invited research presentation delivered at the conference, “Public
Private Partnerships:  Solving Public Problems through Partnerships between Government,
Business and Nonprofits.” This conference was held at the Maxine Goodman Levin College of
Urban Affairs of Cleveland State University on August 15, 2014.
Abstract
This article focuses on two mayoral-led public-private partnerships designed to renew good
government in Cleveland — Mayor George Voinovich’s Operations Improvement Task Force
(OITF) (1979-1982) and Mayor Frank Jackson’s Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF)
(2006-2009).  The Voinovich OITF public-private partnership enabled Cleveland to “come back”
after the city’s 1978 default. The Jackson OETF public-private partnership successfully right-
sized Cleveland in relationship to its much smaller population needs during challenging
economic times without disruptions in service. The authors use three data sources, including
interviews with both mayors and their key partnership managers, to gain a complete inside
picture of each mayoral-led public-private partnership. The article concludes with the lessons
learned and the governance implications of a mayoral-led public-private partnership in fostering
long-term (transformative) administrative change. This article shows how both mayoral-led
public-private partnerships quietly transformed Cleveland’s government to meet the demands of
fewer resources, greater complexity, more transparency, and more timely decisions in the
delivery of public services to citizens.
Key Words: Cleveland, Mayor George Voinovich, Mayor Frank Jackson, public-private
partnerships, urban change, operations improvement, operations efficiency 
0
It may be laid down as a general rule, that [the people’s]
confidence in and obedience to a government, will be proportioned
to the goodness or badness of its administration.
Publius (Alexander Hamilton) Federalist Paper #1
Introduction
To avoid fiscal insolvency while modernizing municipal operations to fit shrinking and
changing population needs, Mayor George Voinovich and Mayor Frank Jackson of Cleveland
have used public-private partnerships to tap into business, nonprofit, and community-based
resources to secure a new and positive future for Clevelanders.  Specifically, this article analyzes
Mayor Voinovich’s Operations Improvement Task Force (OITF) (1979-1982) and Mayor
Jackson’s Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF) (2006-2009) from the inside out. Based on
this inside-out approach, we show how and why the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships
were indispensable to successful management of urban change and the renewal of good
government in Cleveland.
Public-private partnerships are elusive to define (Mendel & Brudney 2012).  After
conducting an extensive review of the literature, Ansell and Gash (2007) identified 137 public-
partnership cases, but they varied significantly as for their leadership, goals, resources,
operations, citizen engagement, and impacts.  For the sake of this analysis, we use the definition
of public-partnerships formulated by Mayor Voinovich. In 1979, he was the first big-city mayor
to bring together on a large scale, public, private, and nonprofit stakeholders to work
cooperatively to restore the people’s confidence in city government after a major debacle —
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Cleveland’s default.  For him, a public-private partnership aimed at improving municipal
operations meant good government because:
Business, nonprofit organizations, and foundations must respond to
the call for help from the public sector or suggest on their own
initiative their willingness to support the public sector with human
capital resources and/or financial resources . . . The opportunity for
interaction between the public and private sectors allows for
progress to be made in improving the city’s government and the
community as a whole, . . .  In a time of decreasing funding from
the federal and state governments, if our cities are to survive and
succeed. . . . (Voinovich 2014).  
 Our paper has two research objectives. One objective is to identify the distinctive good
government characteristics of Mayor Voinovich’s OITF public-partnership that enabled
Cleveland to come back after the municipal default caused the city’s economic engine to sputter
(Steiner 1999). The second objective is to identify the distinctive good government
characteristics of Mayor Jackson’s OETF public-private partnership that successfully right-sized
Cleveland’s government during trying economic times, including the Great Recession of 2008,
without disruptions in municipal services to residents.
Our analysis is organized into five sections. The first section describes five good
government partnership that frame our analysis of the Voinovich OITF partnership and the
Jackson OETF partnership.  The Cleveland setting and the research methodology are discussed in
the second section. The third and fourth sections show how Mayors Voinovich and Jackson used
the five good government partnership behaviors in implementing the OITF and the OETF
partnerships to transform Cleveland successfully. The lessons learned and the governance
implications of the mayoral-led public-private partnership are presented in the fifth section. 
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Five Good Government Partnership Behaviors 
Our analysis of the Voinovich OITF and the Jackson OETF partnerships is grounded in
the network scholarship of Michael McGuire and Robert Agranoff.  McGuire and Agranoff 
(2011, 266) define a public management network as one type of collaborative activity involving
multiple organizations and multiple perspectives; these organizations join together to solve a
major problem that a single entity cannot solve easily or by acting alone.  However, public
management networks are not panaceas because they have severe limitations, not the least of
which is inertia. Therefore, McGuire & Agranoff encourage researchers to study how public
management networks can be managed effectively to overcome inertia and deliver results.
Accordingly, our study of the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships in Cleveland
examines their inside operations in terms of four network management behaviors identified by
McGuire and Agranoff (2014)  — activating, mobilizing, framing, and synthesizing. Thus, our
research question is as follows:  Do the public-private partnerships of Cleveland Mayors
Voinovich and Jackson aimed at operations improvement to avoid fiscal insolvency involve the
behaviors of activating, mobilizing, framing, and synthesizing?  Our research also reveals that the
Cleveland mayors adopted a fifth network management behavior that we define as sustaining the
public-private partnership results.  Each management behavior is defined briefly in turn. 
First, activation focuses on the mayor’s leadership philosophy, and his partnership vision
of operations improvement that require speedy action to address an urgent municipal fiscal
situation. Activating behaviors also refer to the mayor’s incorporation of key persons and
stakeholders who take charge of organizing the governance of the public-private partnership.
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Second, mobilization focuses on the mayor’s leadership in cultivating the internal and
external support for his public-private partnership vision of operations improvement. Thus, 
mobilization activities generate commitments for securing the information, financial, and human
resources needed to operationalize the partnership. An essential aspect of mobilization is the
identification of partnership champions and process leaders. Champions are those who sell the
public-private partnership idea internally to department heads and city employees and to the
external community, including funders, municipal unions, civic groups, elected officials, and
county officials; process leaders are the vision keepers who are responsible for the day-to-day
management of the public-private partnership.
Third, framing behaviors translate the partnership vision and the commitments for
operations improvement into municipal policies and practices. Framing also focuses on building
the capacity of partnership external volunteer participants and city employees through training
and development. Furthermore, framing includes the establishment of an operations
improvement coordinator responsible for monitoring the implementation of the change proposals 
emerging from the study phase of the partnership process. These framing activities incorporate
the practices of professional management into a work culture of delivering excellent city service.
Fourth, synthesizing activities enhance the work conditions that lead to a collaborative
environment and productive interactions among the internal and external partnership members.
In other words, through synthesis, the mayor and his partnership managers remove the obstacles
and create opportunities for the participants to build relationships of trust so that they can focus
on the achievement of results. In effect, synthesis behaviors develop a citywide orientation
4
among internal participants that culminate in the successful completion of the partnership’s goals
and objectives.
Fifth, sustaining behaviors integrate the public-private partnership’s methodology of
operations improvement into day-to-day municipal governance, resulting in long-term
(transformational) urban change. The integration of the partnership’s methodology into day-to-
day municipal administration makes it less likely for long-term city employees to view operations
improvement as the “pet project” of a short-term mayor whose term in office is limited.  
Research Setting and Methodology
The research setting for our analysis of the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships
focuses on Cleveland in 1979 and in 2006. Our single-city setting is consistent with Mendel and
Brudney’s (2012) argument that this method controls for contextual differences inside public-
private partnerships. Given our long view of Cleveland’s partnership history, we can differentiate
between the short-term and long-term (transformational) impacts of the Voinovich OITF
partnership and the Jackson OETF partnership, respectively.  In this way, our analysis deepens
understanding of how the two public-private partnerships successfully helped the city of
Cleveland adapt to a changing environment.
Our research uses multiple data sources to provide an inside view of Cleveland’s public-
private partnerships. The first source is the Voinovich Documents Collection in the Ohio
University Library.  The Voinovich archives reveal a hidden history of the key actors who
worked on Mayor Voinovich’s OITF partnership nearly forty years ago. The second source is a
document analysis. We use information gathered from the private collection of Mayor Voinovich
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and the senior authors who served as volunteers on Mayor Jackson’s OETF partnership. Personal
interviews are the third data source. Besides interviewing Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson,
we gathered information from seven key leaders associated with the Voinovich OITF and
Jackson OETF partnerships. [Endnote 1]
The Five Good Government Partnership Behaviors in the Voinovich OITF
Table 1 organizes the milestone activities of Mayor Voinovich’s OITF partnership by the
five good government behaviors listed in the top row. The first column divides the Voinovich
OITF partnership into four phases: (1) the formation of the public-private partnership concept;
(2) the development of the OITF partnership; (3) the partnership operations; and (4) the
partnership’s follow-up activities.
<<<Table 1 about here>>>
Activating Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1979)
Studying government through public-private partnerships inhered in Mayor Voinovich’s
work ethic.  Steiner (1999) described Voinovich as a calm public servant who applied a
thoughtful, analytical, and nonpartisan approach to every challenge. Steiner also observed that
Voinovich consistently empowered others to help him set a course of action that was best for
making a positive difference in the lives of citizens.  Voinovich summarized this leadership
philosophy of empowerment as “Together We Can Do It,” as follows:  
I believe government’s highest calling is to empower people and
galvanize their energy and resources to help solve our problems,
meet our challenges, and seize our opportunities.  I also believe it’s
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a leader’s role to reach deep into every individual, draw out the
goodness that’s inside, and inspire people to use that goodness to
help themselves, their families, and their communities (Cited in
Riffe 1999, 1).
   
Moreover, Voinovich combined this leadership philosophy and analytical management approach
of operations efficiency with an unwavering commitment to Cleveland. 
Voinovich’s steadfast conviction to his hometown was evident in his unexpected decision
to resign as Ohio Lieutenant Governor and run for the Cleveland mayoralty in 1979.  At that
time, Cleveland was broke — “in fact and spirit” (deWindt 1981).  Due to the high inflation of
the late 1970s, Cleveland’s expenditures increased dramatically. The city’s spending was
exacerbated by its geographic size that was based on one million residents. Given that
Cleveland’s population fell to 573,822 by 1979, budget shortfalls were inevitable. Instead of
addressing these budget and structural issues, the city relied on short-run strategies that included
the selling of municipal assets, such as its transportation and sewer systems, to receive one-time
revenue and by using federal program funds, such as the LEAA and CBDG, to pay for city
operations (Voinovich 2013). 
Moreover, Cleveland residents were suffering due to deplorable living conditions with
streets strewn with litter, blighted neighborhoods, racial polarization in the unresponsive police
department, and the “countless breakdowns in the machinery of government” (deWindt 1981;
Bryan 2014).  According to Voinovich (2013), Cleveland was in a dire situation. 
The Mayor and City Council were at war with each other. The
administration was at war with the neighborhoods. It was reported
that a key administration official punched a nun. The neighborhood
people were at war with the Police Department for a lack of a
police response and perceived excessive force.  The organization
representing black policemen was suing the city for racial
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discrimination in the department.  The city was up in arms over
schooling busing and a federal judge that mishandled it.
Neighborhoods devastated from the riots of the late 60s [had
approximately] 5,000 properties that were in need of immediate
demolition.  The city-owned electric company became a public
football in spite of being on the verge of collapse. Unemployment
was about 18%, and the city had a real hunger crisis.
Furthermore, Mayor Dennis Kucinich rejected attempts by the business community to help him
address these problems. Instead, he declared war on Cleveland’s corporate leaders, publicly
denouncing them in national arenas as “fat cats” who wanted to dictate to the “little people”
(deWindt 1981; Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007).  The combination of the city’s financial instability,
its political infighting, and Kucinich’s divisive administrative style sparked a special election to
recall the mayor. Although Mayor Kucinich narrowly survived the recall, he was unable to secure
credit from the Cleveland bankers when $14 million in short-term municipal loans came due.  In
particular, the business community wanted Kucinich to privatize the city’s municipal utility
(known as Muny Light). Kucinich’s refusal to sell Muny Light prompted the Cleveland Trust to
demand repayment of its loans, forcing the city to default in 1978.
After the national disgrace of Cleveland’s default, E.M. deWindt, the Chairman of the
Eaton Corporation, organized an intense corporate effort to recruit Lt. Governor Voinovich to run
for mayor. To help Voinovich reverse the city’s dire direction, de Windt (1981) pledged that he
would secure corporate funding to underwrite and provide the human capital necessary for
establishing a public-private partnership aimed at improving the operations of Cleveland.  Given
this pledge, Voinovich shelved  his gubernatorial ambition because he realized, he could “do
more as mayor . . . and because of the dire situation it could be the most significant contribution
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[he] could make in [his] career in government” (Voinovich 2013).  Voinovich’s vision for a
public-private partnership centered on operations improvement convinced the city’s corporate
leaders that:
Cleveland would give birth to a rare animal:  a task force that
would result in action rather than rhetoric.  Like most big cities,
Cleveland had been studied to near death.  In recent years, five
separate studies, including a Little Hoover Commission, focused
on Cleveland.  Each study ended up with a thick, spiral-bound
tome and precious little action.  We had had enough pretty pictures
and multicolored charts.  This time there had to be action . . .  and
plenty of it (deWindt 1981). 
In November 1979, Voinovich, a Republican, decisively defeated Mayor Kucinich, a Democrat,
by receiving 56% of the votes cast in solidly blue Cleveland.  
One day after his election, Voinovich went to work with deWindt to develop the OITF
public-private partnership.  Within three weeks of Voinovich’s election, deWindt had the OITF’s
governing structure in place (see Table 2).  At the top was a twelve-member Executive
Committee that acted as a board of directors, setting the policy objectives and providing the
financial and personnel resources for the OITF.  As shown in Table 2, the Executive Secretary of
the Cleveland AFL-CIO was incorporated into the OITF’s Executive Committee. Headed by
deWindt, the Executive Committee engaged twenty-one business leaders as members of the
Ways and Means Committee. The Ways and Means Committee meticulously recruited and
assigned top business specialists to fit the precise technical needs of the OITF study teams. The
OITF’s implementation rested with a five-member Operating Committee, headed by Robert
Hunter, the CEO of the Weatherhead Corporation. Thus, the OITF public-private partnership was
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structured as a “business enterprise of global proportions” (deWindt 1981).  
<<<Table 2 about here>>>
Mobilizing Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1980)
One day after his inauguration Mayor Voinovich sought to determine the true financial
condition of the city. A state audit revealed that the city’s accounting records were “unauditable”
(Voinovich 2013).  Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly placed Cleveland under the fiscal
supervision of the state’s Financial Planning Commission in January 1980.  Consequently, the
mayor established the Volunteer Financial Audit Task Force comprised primarily of accountants
from the big-eight firms. The auditors found that the city was $110 million in debt.  In effect,
Cleveland’s financial position was much bleaker than Voinovich expected. Thus, negotiating a
debt repayment plan, restoring the city’s positive credit rating, and ending the state’s supervision
of Cleveland’s finances were the mayor’s fiscal objectives folded into the scope of the Voinovich
OITF public-private partnership. 
The external champion of the OITF partnership was deWindt, and under his leadership,
the Executive Committee raised $794,000, including challenge grants of $150,000 and $100,000
from the Cleveland Foundation and Gund Foundation, respectively.  Additionally, deWindt and
Morton Mandel, a prominent Cleveland entrepreneur and philanthropist serving on the Ways and
Means Committee, generated widespread community support that resulted in $544,000 in
additional funds for the operation of the Voinovich OITF partnership.  Specifically, 264 private
firms (88%) and 36 not-for-profit organizations (12%) in Greater Cleveland served as sponsors
of the OITF partnership.  Among the OITF sponsors were eight (8) labor unions (OITF 1982). 
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Our interviews revealed that the internal champion of the Voinovich OITF partnership
was Council President George Forbes.  Shortly after assuming office, Mayor Voinovich  met
with the Council President to persuade him that his OITF partnership agenda was aimed at
making Cleveland a better place for everyone everywhere in the city to live. According to
Voinovich (2014), the Council President was impressed that the Greater Cleveland Roundtable
supported the mayor’s OITF partnership agenda. By securing the support of the Roundtable, the
OITF partnership tapped into “our United Nations that dealt with jobs, economic development,
and education, labor, and race relations” because “its membership included CEOs, elected
officials, religious leaders, union officials, neighborhood activists, and the leaders of the African-
American, Hispanic, and ethnic communities” (Voinovich 2013).  It is important to note that the
mayor excluded tax policy and city council operations from the OITF  partnership’s scope (Bryan
2014).  In this way, Mayor Voinovich respected the Council’s prerogatives and gained the
support of the Council President. Without the Council President’s behind-the-scene political
leadership the work of the Voinovich OITF partnership would have failed.
 Two consulting organizations, the Government Research Institute (GRI) of Cleveland
and Warren King and Associates (WKA), served as the process leaders of the OITF partnership.
[Endnote 2] GRI managed the finances of the OITF partnership and provided logistical support to
the Operating Committee. WKA provided the templates for the time frames and the scope of the
loaned executive work, the formats of the OITF change recommendations, and the preparation of
the final report (Bryan 2014). The internal process leader was the OITF Implementation
Coordinator Ben Bryan who was a contract employee, and his salary was funded by the OITF
partnership. Bryan reported directly to Hunter as the Operating Committee Chairman. When
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Hunter retired in 1982, Bryan was hired as a full-time city employee in the Mayor’s Office, and
he reported to Tom Wagner, the city’s law director. 
The Ways and Means Committee successfully recruited 89 loaned executives for twelve
weeks of OITF duty. These volunteers included “lawyers, accountants, administrators; CEOs,
and CFOs; engineers experts in computers and human relations and every management
discipline” (deWindt 1981).  Four study teams of business volunteers were formed to study the
63 agencies within the city, and the chair of each team was a member of the Operating
Committee. [Endnote 3]  In effect, every city department and administrative process was within
the OITF partnership’s purview.  Before the loaned executives were embedded in the study
teams, WKA trained them about the differences between the public and private sectors, reminded
them their  purpose was to share best practices respectfully with city employees, and praised
them for their willingness to help their hometown (Bryan 2014).
Framing Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1980)
The stated goal of the Voinovich OITF partnership was: “To help improve the quality of
life for the people of Cleveland by making local government more responsive to citizen needs.”
To frame the work of the OITF study teams, the Executive Committee set the following
objectives: (1) identify immediate opportunities for increasing efficiency and improving cost
effectiveness that could be realized by executive or administrative order; (2) suggest managerial,
operating and organizational improvements for immediate and long-term consideration by the
Mayor and City Council; and (3) pinpoint specific areas where further in-depth analysis could be
justified by potential short or long-term benefit (OITF 1982).
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Mayor Voinovich’s unwavering commitment to the OITF partnership set a positive tone
throughout the city and framed his larger focus on the primacy of professional management. 
However, when Voinovich assumed office, city hall operations were chaotic, and staff morale
was low (Bryan 2014).  As a group, the city commissioners (the highest civil service ranking
employees) felt broken, and the rank-and-file employees were afraid that “heads would roll”
based on what the loaned executives would do (Interviews 2014).  
Within three weeks of taking office, Mayor Voinovich sent a memo to reassure city
managers and build their support for the OITF study process. Specifically, he asked all
department directors and city commissioners to provide an itemized list of the status of service in
their units, using a rating scale of “inadequate,” “adequate,” and “more than adequate” service.
The mayor also encouraged them to share their thoughts about how to organize their departments
to function better and more efficiently. Their responses were fed back to the OITF study teams
and ultimately became a part of the OITF partnership’s change proposals. Voinovich believed
this employee-centered process helped him gain the management staff’s confidence in the
partnership’s goal of operations improvement.
To build staff morale, Mayor Voinovich established a culture of professional
management at city hall. One way he did this was to remove the patronage politics that pervaded
city administration.  In particular, he eliminated the requirement for city employees to kick back
a portion of their salary by buying or selling tickets for mayoral campaign fund-raisers.  Mayor
Voinovich made it clear to all city employees that he would base their evaluations on their job
performance rather than on the number of campaign tickets they sold or on their personal
relationships with the mayor (Voinovich 2014).  
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Another way Mayor Voinovich professionalized the culture was by his involving city
employees in the OITF study process. In framing the OITF, he approached them to find out what
they were doing right by soliciting their ideas about what they could do better. The message he
sent was “how can we help you do your job better, smarter, and in the most cost-effective way?”
(Voinovich 2014).  In addition, the OITF Implementation Coordinator met regularly with every
city commissioner, thereby tapping into their expertise and institutional knowledge of the sixty-
three operating units. Without this employee-centered process to frame the OITF Partnership,
Voinovich believed that improving the city’s operations would not have been possible 
(Voinovich 2014).
Synthesizing Behavior of Mayor Voinovich (1980-82)
Unlike the strife characterizing Mayor Kucinich’s relationship to the City Council, Mayor
Voinovich restored civility between Cleveland’s executive and legislative branches.  Moreover,
the Council President as the internal OITF partnership champion was a true ally of the mayor
because privately he built the political majority necessary to enact the OITF change proposals. 
Eventually, the council passed sixty OITF-related ordinances that focused on operations,
management, and service delivery.
Within ninety days of its inception, the OITF Partnership delivered a comprehensive
evaluation of Cleveland’s city government. This report had 650 workable recommendations, each
of which was vetted and edited by the Operating Committee. Afterwards, Mayor Voinovich
required his department directors to develop implementation plans for their units, and he
evaluated their performance heavily in terms of their progress. The mayor also met weekly with
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the Operating Committee and the OITF Implementation Coordinator, whose sole responsibility
was to track and facilitate the progress made in carrying out the improvement recommendations
(Bryan 2014).  Once a month, the mayor devoted time at his cabinet meeting for the department
heads to report to their peers their progress in implementing their OITF action plans. Informally,
Mayor Voinovich conferred “eagle” and “jackass” awards to those department heads that made
an outstanding or a limited effort, respectively, in carrying out their OITF commitments
(Voinovich 2014).  The leadership and direct engagement of Mayor Voinovich in synthesizing
the OITF implementation activities was vital to the partnership’s success.
Overall, 94% of the OITF recommendations were implemented that reduced the city
workforce by 4% and saved $200 million collectively (OITF 1982). Additionally, Mayor
Voinovich reorganized ten departments, instituted an accounting system with internal auditing
capabilities, and achieved savings of $57 million annually. He also set controls on police
overtime and adopted a computerized communication system to speed up the response time of
safety forces, streamlined purchasing transactions, instituted a city-wide vehicle control and
maintenance system, revamped the snow removal process, upgraded data processing capabilities,
and improved personnel procedures (deWindt 1981; OITF 1982).  By the end of 1981, Cleveland
was no longer in default, and the city achieved an investment grade for its credit rating; fiscal
control was returned to the city when the state’s supervisory commission disbanded in June 1987.
At its conclusion in March 1982, the leadership of the OITF partnership delivered a
second report to Mayor Voinovich. This report directed the mayor’s attention to the needed
middle- and long-term strategies for the professional management of Cleveland’s finances and
service delivery.  Based on this report, Mayor Voinovich and the OITF Executive Committee
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identified fourteen major improvement projects, including an enhanced computer-aided dispatch
system for the police department; a wage and salary administration study; a building maintenance
system; EEO program assistance; a fire location study; and a payroll system (Bryan 2014).  The
mayor used 66 percent of the funds raised by the OITF public-private partnership (or $596,000)
to cover the cost of implementing these fourteen projects (see Exhibit III, OITF 1982). 
An important synthesizing feature of the Voinovich OITF partnership was that it fostered
professional relationships between the loaned private sector executives and their city
counterparts. As deWindt (1981) noted the OITF recommendations were integrated into city
operations for two reasons. The first reason is that city employees embraced the OITF study
process  because they participated in making the decisions about what to change in their own
work settings.  The second reason is that the loaned executives found that most city employees
were dedicated, hard-working, and willing to go beyond the call of duty, despite laboring under
inefficient practices, untrained managers, inadequate resources, outdated equipment, and faulty
technology. 
Overall, the Cleveland business community became fully invested in Mayor Voinovich’s
OITF partnership to restore good government in the city (Interviews 2014).  The leadership of the
OITF public-private partnership reported that Cleveland:
. . .  expanded vital channels of communication between the public
and private sectors.  Without the cooperation of the city’s
employees, the progress achieved would not have been possible.  In
addition, task force members have developed a better 
understanding of the complex problems of municipal government
management through their work with agency officials (OITF 1982).
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In fact, many loaned executives stayed involved with their city counterparts on their own time
long after the study period ended, and some loaned executives joined the city’s work force
(Bryan 2014). Strategically, the mayor expanded these channels of communication between the
public and private sectors to sustain the results of the OITF partnership.
Sustaining Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1982-89)
Mayor Voinovich in partnership with Council President Forbes institutionalized the
OITF’s legacy.  In 1981, the Council voted to place two OITF-inspired charter amendments on
the ballot. One amendment lengthened the terms of the mayor and council members from two to
four years in addition to strengthening the mayor’s executive powers; the other amendment
clarified the prevailing wage requirements for city workers.  Both charter changes were approved
by the voters. The voters also approved an earnings tax earmarked for debt repayment and capital
improvements (Vogelsang-Coombs 2007).
To sustain the work of the OITF partnership internally, Mayor Voinovich, assisted by
philanthropist Morton Mandel, created Project MOVE — the Mayor’s Operation Volunteer
Effort. Overall, Project MOVE channeled 8,000 volunteer business and community leaders into
most levels of all city departments (Garda, n.d.). To recognize the contributions of the volunteers,
Voinovich established the Mayor’s Award for Volunteerism and designated “a wall of fame” in
Cleveland city hall, where plaques still hang to honor the MOVE volunteers (Voinovich 2014). 
Much has been written about the immediate outcomes of the OITF partnership, so we will
only present some highlights. As a result of the OITF, the city secured $149 million in Urban
Development Action Grants that leveraged $770 million in private investments, including
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projects for neighborhood revitalization (Mendel & Brudney 2012).  With the financial assistance
of Cleveland Tomorrow, the Voinovich administration facilitated the expansion of Cleveland’s 
neighborhood development organizations (CNDCs) to improve the residents’ quality of life, and
the number of CNDCs grew from twelve to thirty-five (Voinovich 2013). [Endnote 4] Because of
the OITF partnership, the city was much more active in all of Cleveland’s neighborhoods than
under previous mayoral administrations (Interview 2014). 
Additionally, Mayor Voinovich worked with the Greater Cleveland Roundtable, an early
supporter of the OITF, to improve race relations, and he integrated the Cleveland police and fire
departments under a court order. Given the constraints of limited tax revenue and debt financing,
the mayor worked with Build-Up Greater Cleveland to raise $1.6 billion to renew the city’s aging
infrastructure (Voinovich 2013). Finally, the OITF partnership laid the groundwork for the
creation of two public-private partnerships that transformed Cleveland’s downtown
neighborhood. The first partnership developed the North Coast Harbor, where several landmark
cultural institutions, including the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the Great Lakes Science
Center, chose to locate. The second partnership developed Cleveland’s signature Playhouse
Square. According to Voinovich (2013), more construction happened during his mayoral
administration than any other time in Cleveland’s history. 
Overall, the implementation of Mayor Voinovich’s public-private partnership and its 
sustained effects enabled Cleveland to rise from the ashes of the municipal default into the
“comeback city.” Cleveland received national recognition by winning the prestigious All-
America City Award from the National Civic League three times in the ten years of the
Voinovich administration.  On retiring from the Cleveland mayoralty in 1989, Voinovich (2013)
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had a proud moment because USA Today wrote an article about him and Council President
Forbes “as the short white Republican mayor and the tall African-American [Democratic]
Council President that worked together to bring about the Cleveland Renaissance.”
It is important to note that the OITF leadership identified four critical areas that required
ongoing attention by city leaders — personnel management; data processing/information
technology management; management organization; and capital investment and maintenance
(OITF 1982).  Three issues — personnel management, data processing/technology management,
and management organization — resurfaced in 2006 as the priorities of Mayor Frank Jackson’s
Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF).  
The Five Good Government Partnership Behaviors in the Jackson OETF Partnership
Table 3 organizes the milestone activities of Mayor Jackson’s OETF by the five good
government partnership behaviors listed in the top row. The first column divides the OETF into
four phases: (1) the formation of the OETF partnership concept; (2) the development of the
OETF; (3) the OETF operations; and (4) the OETF’s follow-up activities.  
<<<Table 3 about here>>>
Activating Behaviors of Mayor Jackson (2006)
Pundits described Frank Jackson’s character as “honest” and “contemplative,” a self-
effacing politician without “ego or ambition” (Roberts 2012, 11).  His council colleagues
perceived him as a man of high integrity, an exceptionally good listener, and an excellent reader
of people (Westbrook 2014).  Jackson described himself as a “servant-leader” with a social
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equity mission to make a difference in the lives of citizens, especially “for those among us who
have the least.”  In his view, government was different from the private sector. Although
government, he said, benefitted by applying business-oriented efficiency practices in its
operations, its bottom line was quality service to people (Jackson 2014).
Council President Frank Jackson made history in November 2005 because he was the first
sitting council member elected Cleveland mayor since 1867 (Roberts 2012).  After thirteen years
on the City Council, including four years as Council President and Finance Committee chair,
Jackson developed extensive technical knowledge of Cleveland’s operations. His cooperative
relations with Mayor Jane Campbell deteriorated in 2004 when she failed to keep the Council
informed about the city’s operating deficit and her plans for layoffs and an income tax levy.
Jackson felt compelled to run for mayor because, as the chair of the Finance Committee, he
clearly understood Cleveland’s fiscal problems and knew what had to be done (Jackson 2014). 
When Mayor Jackson assumed his new office, Cleveland’s population was 406,427 ( or
167,400 less than twenty-four years earlier under Mayor Voinovich), and the U.S. Census Bureau
identified Cleveland as the nation’s poorest (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan 2008).  Despite
losing approximately one-third of its 1980 population, Cleveland’s service delivery infrastructure
had changed little since the Voinovich administration. Moreover, few Fortune 500 companies
remained headquartered in the city, Cleveland’s steel mills were closed, and local manufacturing
companies were struggling. Given that city employees lacked up-to-date hardware, software, and
basic computer training, the city’s operations were inefficient because few administrative
processes were automated.  Labor relations were tense because of the layoffs done under the
Campbell administration, and the staff downsizing disrupted service delivery to residents. 
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As the newly elected mayor, Jackson inherited a deficit of $30 million from his
predecessor.  Nevertheless, Jackson refused to sell city assets or use one-time revenues sources to
balance the city’s budget. For him, good government meant that Cleveland operated efficiently 
within its tax and revenue base.  Thus, the overarching purpose of Mayor Jackson’s public-
private partnership was to eliminate the city’s recurring budget shortfalls and restore its financial
stability while rightsizing Cleveland’s government and maintaining quality essential city services
(Jackson 2014). Furthermore, the OETF partnership served as the platform from which Mayor
Jackson launched his vision of securing a positive future for Clevelanders in addition to making
Cleveland a great city again.
Before launching his public-private partnership, Mayor Jackson consulted with Tom
Wagner, the law director who supervised Mayor Voinovich’s OITF partnership.  In the end,
Jackson chose not to adopt a cookie-cutter approach to activate his OETF partnership because
Cleveland’s environment had changed substantially from the time of Mayor Voinovich.
Moreover, he was firm that his OETF partnership’s approach to operations efficiency would be
driven by government and public sector values (Jackson 2014). Thus, he created the OETF
partnership as a broad-based coalition, drawing members from government, business, academia,
nonprofit organizations, state and local officials, and former cabinet officials (OETF 2006). In
effect, the mayor structured the OETF partnership to fit Cleveland as he found the city in 2006
and his own leadership style. 
Within a month of taking office, Jackson activated the Operations Efficiency Task Force
(OETF). At the top of the OETF partnership was the Operations Efficiency Council (see Table
4). This Council set the partnership’s strategic direction in addition to serving as the oversight
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body. The council’s chair was the city’s chief operating officer (COO) Darnell Brown. Besides
him, seven volunteers, the city’s chief technology officer, and three mayoral assistants served on
the Operations Efficiency Council.  The seven volunteers were prominent community and
business leaders, information technology experts, and leadership experts from Cleveland State 
University.
<<Table 4 about here>>>
It is important to note that an active member of the Operations Efficiency Council was
Jay Westbrook, a highly respected councilman and a former council president. The Westbrook
appointment insured that the city council had significant input into the OETF partnership process
and up-to-date knowledge of Cleveland’s financial condition. This financial transparency led to
the city council’s willingness to support the changes emerging from the Jackson OETF
partnership with legislation (Westbrook 2014; Sweeney 2014). 
Similarly, the city’s labor unions became the strategic allies of Mayor Jackson. In March
2006, the mayor briefed the union leadership about his employee-centered operation efficiency
plans in light of the city’s bleak fiscal condition and unfavorable financial forecasts. Boldly,
Jackson asked the labor leaders for temporary contract concessions so that he could balance the
city’s budget without disrupting service to the residents. Furthermore, the mayor pledged that if
the unions made concessions to help him achieve a budget in structural balance, then he would
maintain the city’s employment levels and not lay off staff.  All but one union leader agreed, and
the roll backs in the labor contracts immediately saved the city $30 million (Jackson 2014). 
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Mayor Jackson succeeded in gaining labor’s cooperation for his OETF partnership because the
union leaders trusted him and believed in his integrity.
 As shown in Table 4, the OETF partnership had a Communications Advisory Team
whose membership included public relations professionals from business, government, and the
media as well as mayoral assistants and the city’s press secretary. This team was responsible for
keeping stakeholders and the public informed about the work of the Jackson OETF partnership.  
Mobilizing Activities of Mayor Jackson (2006)
Although Mayor Jackson was the executive sponsor of the OETF partnership, the overall
partnership champion was COO Brown. Under Brown’s leadership, the Operations Efficiency
Council recruited approximately 406 volunteers from the Greater Cleveland Partnership (the
regional business chamber) and its affiliate, the Cleveland Leadership Center, as well as alumni
of Cleveland State University’s MPA Program and Local Officials Leadership Academy (see
Table 5). These volunteers contributed more than 12,000 hours of service worth approximately
$1.7 million in expertise (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan 2008).  Whereas the leadership of
Mayor Voinovich’s OITF partnership raised approximately $1 million from the private and
nonprofit sectors, Mayor Jackson’s OETF public-private partnership existed entirely on the
donated time and in-kind services of the volunteers.
<<<Table 5 about here>>>
The internal process leader of the Jackson OETF partnership was Michele Whitlow, an
employee with the Cleveland Water division; she had a mobility assignment to head the OETF
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Project Management Office (PMO). The PMO staff developed the operations efficiency
methodology; standardized formats for the Action Teams to gather, analyze and share critical
information developed the templates for tracking performance measures; and provided technical
assistance during the implementation of the recommendations of the OETF Action Teams. The
PMO staff also had the daily oversight of the Action Teams and reported monthly to the
Operations Efficiency Council. 
Finally, the leadership of the Jackson OETF partnership reached out to inner-ring
suburban mayors. Three mayors, all of whom had chaired the Cuyahoga Mayors and Managers
Association, participated in a focus group. [Endnote 5]. The suburban mayors offered
suggestions to increase operational efficiencies with a special emphasis on inter-local service
agreements. During the Jackson administration, Cleveland joined the Northeast Ohio City
Council Association (NOCCA).  Additionally, Mayor Jackson supported a “no poaching”
economic development strategy, whereby municipal officials agreed not to lure businesses to
relocate from one Greater Cleveland location to another (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan 2008).   
Framing Activities of Mayor Jackson (2006-2007)
In April 2006, Mayor Jackson held his first meeting with all OETF volunteers and
participating city employees, where he unveiled the charter of his public-private partnership (see
Figure 1). This charter established the OETF partnership’s urgent good (efficient) government
purpose. Additionally, the charter expressed the OETF partnership’s guiding principles that
included Mayor Jackson’s commitments to value the expertise of employees, give them with
opportunities for retraining, and enable them to share their learning. Besides clarifying the roles
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and responsibilities of OETF participants, the charter cited thirteen critical success factors,
including the elimination of service gaps across city departments, the use of innovative solutions
in service delivery, and the utilization of technology to enhance data collection and guide
decision making. Thus, the public-private partnership charter framed the mayor’s plans to foster
a citywide culture of excellent performance and customer service.   
<<Insert Figure 1 here>>
To reinforce his commitment to good government principles, Mayor Jackson held
meetings with all city employees and stakeholders, including the unions. At these meetings, he
reiterated the OETF’s partnership purpose of operations efficiency, shared information about the
city’s financial condition and revenue projections, and pledged to maintain employment under a
structurally balanced budget.  The mayor continued these meetings annually to renew the
employees’ confidence in the usefulness of the partnership’s approach to operations efficiency
and to maintain morale (Jackson 2014). 
Also, as a part of the framing process, Mayor Jackson informed his cabinet directors that
he expected them to live within their budgets. Accordingly, he ended the practice of padding one
department’s budget to pay for cost overruns generated in another department. He also informed
his directors that the cost savings generated by their departments and divisions would be
redistributed to those city operations where they would produce the greatest efficiencies,
customer service improvements, and productivity gains (Jackson 2014). 
Specifically, the work of the OETF partnership was divided into two phases: eight Action
Teams operated in Phase 1 (2006-2007), and sixteen Action Teams in Phase 2 (2007-2008)
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Taken as a group, the OETF Action Teams covered all aspects of city operations except public
safety. [Endnote 6] To build the capacity of the Action Team members, the staff from the OETF
Project Management Office (PMO) organized technical, leadership, customer service and
performance measurement training programs for the partnership volunteers and the city
employees to participate together at the beginning of their OETF assignments. Given their
common training experience, city employees felt comfortable in opening their units up to the
outsiders on their Action Teams. These training sessions also built camaraderie among the city
employees who worked in different departments and fostered good will between the city
employees and the outside experts.
 Each Action Team was co-chaired by a department director and a volunteer expert
(called the external lead).  The Action Teams were given the following four objectives: (1) to
reduce operating costs by at least 3%; (2) to enhance city services by using performance
indicators and targets; (3) to increase employee productivity through better use of technology;
and (4) improve customer service to internal and external customers (OETF 2006 & 2007).  The
Action Teams applied the PMO’s performance methodology by assessing the current or “as is,”
work process for their assigned department or citywide service.  After mapping these work
processes, the Action Teams proposed recommendations that contained performance targets and
customer service standards designed to achieve the four OETF objectives.  Overall, the Action
Teams produced 394 recommendations for improving more than 100 city processes operations
from the inside out (OETF 2007).  
Based on their success in producing workable improvement recommendations, city
employees developed an identity as the internal champions of operations efficiency. Because
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these employee-participants were scattered throughout Cleveland’s sixty departments and
divisions, their work on the OETF Action Teams informally facilitated a shift in the city’s work
culture. This shift to a citywide culture of excellent performance and customer service occurred
without an incident because it was driven by the bottom-up, employee-centered approach of the
Jackson OETF partnership.
Synthesizing Behaviors of Mayor Jackson (2007-08)
Mayor Jackson delegated the day-to-day supervision of the OETF Action Teams to COO
Brown. However, if department heads were not meeting their OETF expectations, then the mayor 
would forcefully “get into their business,” demanding to know when and how they would change
their lackluster performance.  In fact, the mayor removed one intransigent division head that
blocked the implementation of the OETF recommendations at the city. In effect, he made it clear
that the implementation of the OETF partnership recommendations was a priority, and he was
serious about seeing results (Jackson 2014).
COO Brown and PMO manager Whitlow combined data-driven decision-making and
management by walking around. In particular, the PMO staff developed performance dashboards
built on the performance targets identified in the OETF recommendations, collected and tracked
performance measurements, and reported the results to the Action Teams. Additionally, the COO
and the PMO staff met with the Action Teams, including the community volunteers and line
employees, in the city’s departments and divisions. This practice gave line employees an
opportunity to engage with top city officials about their operational needs and aspirations.
Interestingly, this practice was replicated by some department directors who opened
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opportunities for their employees to contribute ideas for operations efficiency and improved
customer service (Westbrook 2014). 
Furthermore, a “city of choice” hotline and an email address were set up as other channels
of safe communication between line employees and the city’s top leadership. This propensity for
openness among the highest city officials reinforced the validity of Mayor Jackson’s employee-
centered approach to operations efficiency. The leadership of the OETF partnership extended this
propensity for transparent government to the general public.  At the end of Phase 2, the
Communications Team published the 2008 Mayor’s Annual Report (MAR) to the Citizens of
Cleveland. This report highlighted the city’s improved performance stemming from the change
recommendations of the Jackson OETF partnership, and the city has continued publishing an
annual MAR since then.
When the OETF partnership concluded its operations in 2010, the city implemented 94%
of the OETF recommendations. Collectively, the Action Teams saved $71 million between 2006
and 2009.  Given the substantial annual savings produced by the OETF partnership process, the
mayor balanced the city’s budget in every year of his first term (2006-2010), including 2008 and
2009 during the Great Recession, all without disruptive staff layoffs.  Additionally, the Jackson
OETF partnership improved the quality of life for citizens, including more timely snow removal,
street repair, and waste collection, and more frequent sweeping of residential streets.  The city
also instituted a recycling program.  With no new additional resources, Mayor Jackson reopened
the city’s neighborhood-based recreation centers that were closed under previous mayors due to
tight budgets. As a result of the OETF improvements, the recreation centers extended their hours
to Saturdays, and the city added a new recreation center. 
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The Jackson OETF partnership facilitated opportunities for employees to develop a
citywide perspective. In Phase 1 of the OETF partnership, the city established the Strategic
Information Technology Council.  This council had the oversight of the deployment and
utilization of IT systems across the departments to insure the city’s technology aligned with the
OETF partnership’s strategic goals.  As a result, the city adopted web-enabled interactive portals
for citizen access, established a system of e-permitting, and provided field personnel with hand-
held computers that had direct access to their operational systems. In 2008, the city launched a
“3-1-1” communication system that allowed residents to report and receive faster service in non-
emergency situations.  
In addition, the city established two noteworthy cross-departmental initiatives to serve
older and younger residents. The Senior Initiative involved six departments that helped older
residents (persons aged 60 and over) upgrade their homes to meet housing codes.  The youth
initiative, called “One Voice, Zero Tolerance,” involved staff from three departments and the
mayor’s office; together they developed a package of education, prevention, intervention, and
workforce training services. Both initiatives were still working in 2014.
Finally, the Jackson OETF partnership process extended the cooperation between the city
of Cleveland and suburban jurisdictions.  As a result of some OETF recommendations, the city
established agreements with contiguous jurisdictions related to overlapping functions, such as
snow removal and street repair. Mayor Jackson also worked with the Cuyahoga County Mayors
and Managers Association to develop joint economic agreements tied to Cleveland water service,
in which participating cities shared taxes from relocating industries (Jackson 2009).
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Sustaining Behaviors of Mayor Jackson (2009-2014)
One way Mayor Jackson sustained the OETF improvements internally was by investing in
CitiStat, a data-driven work management system developed in Baltimore.  In 2011, the city
merged the CitiStat and “3-1-1” systems to create a citywide performance dashboard. This
enhanced dashboard gave employees up-to-date data on their response time to citizen complaints,
while department directors gained information about under-served areas of the city. The general
public had access to these performance data because the city published the citywide performance
dashboard in the Mayor’s Annual Report to the citizenry (Whitlow 2014). 
Another way the city sustained the OETF efficiency and productivity gains was by
making staff training and development mayoral priorities. Cross-functional training, mobility
assignments, and internships were used to develop in-house talent and helped establish career
paths for city employees. In a partnership with Cleveland State University and the Cleveland
Foundation, the city established the Cleveland Management Academy (CMA) in 2009. 
Specifically, the CMA was a year-long management development program aligned with the
objectives of the Jackson OETF partnership (Starzyk, 2009). Mayor Jackson (2014) reported that
he promoted eight CMA graduates into positions of department directors and city commissioners
(without knowing they were CMA alumni) because they were the best candidates. Thus, the
Jackson OETF partnership facilitated the creation of a citywide cadre of emerging leaders who
successfully competed for upper-level leadership positions.
Although Cleveland business leaders were nervous about Mayor Jackson in 2006, he
captured their support because of his stewardship of the city through the OETF public-private
partnership. The mayor impressed the business community because the cost savings and
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productivity improvements that emerged from his OETF partnership enabled Cleveland to
survive the Great Recession better than many other cities in the nation (Trickey, 2013).  Mayor
Jackson — who was reelected in 2009 and 2013 — used the respect he earned from the business
community to implement his visionary “Cleveland Plan” to transform the city’s underperforming
and insolvent school district (GCP 2014). [Endnote 7] 
Finally, Cleveland received national attention for its success in implementing the “new
urban renewal” (Hyra 2012). As a part of the OETF, Mayor Jackson created an economic
development cluster in his cabinet to work with the private sector to generate extensive
neighborhood revitalization in addition to transforming the city’s aging downtown into a thriving
residential district. Cleveland also experienced a “brain gain,” as young professionals made
Cleveland their “city of choice.” Trickey (2013) attributed these transformational effects to
Mayor Jackson’s leadership:
A mayor from Cleveland’s poorest neighborhoods is presiding over
a downtown population boom, and a surge of vitality is attracting
young professionals to the city’s near West Side. Jackson helped
those changes along with reliable services, a rejuvenated economic
development department, strategic spending at key moments, and
the more tangible aspects of his sustainability effort, from bike
lanes to support of the local food movement.
Additional evidence that Cleveland was a city of choice occurred in 2014.  Besides
serving as the venue for the international Gay Games, Cleveland was chosen in a highly
competitive selection process as the venue for the Republican Party’s 2016 presidential
nominating convention. The transformation of Cleveland into a city of choice would not have
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occurred without the results of Mayor Jackson’s public-private partnership that were reinforced
by his vision of good (efficient} government and his philosophy of servant-leadership. 
Lessons Learned & Governance Implications
 Our analysis of the public-private partnerships of Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson
from the inside out produced three lessons. The first lesson is that each mayor tailored the
structure and the objectives of his public-private partnership to fit not only to his particular
leadership style but to succeed in addressing declining population and revenues needs of
Cleveland during their moment in office. Specifically, Mayor Voinovich organized the OITF
public-private partnership as a tactical strike force. His partnership used a top-down, hierarchical
structure and was funded generously by Cleveland’s business, nonprofit, and labor communities
to deal with the urgency of the municipal default. He achieved the objectives of the OITF
partnership for increasing the efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of administrative operations to
end the default. Given his strategic alliance with Council President Forbes, Mayor Voinovich
achieved long-term managerial, operating, and organizational improvements in municipal
governance.  Based on the work of the OITF partnership, Mayor Voinovich pinpointed fourteen
major administrative projects in need of additional study; he used funds raised by the OITF
partnership to implement productivity improvements for the long-term management of
Cleveland’s finances and service delivery. 
In contrast, Mayor Jackson organized his OETF public-private partnership as a strategic
campaign. His partnership used a bottom-up, flat structure driven by public sector values and the
donated contributions of the outside volunteers. Mayor Jackson successfully achieved a
32
structurally balanced budget and modernized administrative operations. He also achieved the
objectives of the OETF partnership of reducing operating costs by 3 percent; applying
performance measures to improve city services; using technology to increase employee
productivity; and improving service delivery to internal and external customers. Building on the
success of the OETF partnership, Mayor Jackson garnered the support of the Cleveland business
community, and he achieved major transformational changes in the city, such as the innovative
Cleveland Plan for reinventing K-12 education.
The second lesson highlights how the mayors gained the trust of city employees for their 
public-private partnerships. Both the Voinovich and Jackson partnerships created an employee-
centered process to study and improve administrative operations. Specifically, the Voinovich
partnership concentrated on gaining the support of the city commissioners (the highest civil
service employees), thereby tapping into their expertise, institutional knowledge, and role in
supervising staff. The Jackson partnership concentrated on gaining the support of the city’s labor
unions to ease tensions in employee relations. Both partnerships set ground rules for the
volunteers to treat city employees respectfully by listening to their ideas, advising them on best
practices from the corporate and nonprofit sectors, and suggesting operational improvements.
After the employees and the volunteers merged ideas and improvement recommendations, they
co-designed performance measures. This process contributed to employee ownership for the
implementation of the partnership’s change proposals. It also led to creativity, innovation, and
sustained improvements in city operations. 
The third lesson focuses on the effects of participation in the Voinovich and Jackson
public-private partnerships. Feedback from city employees revealed how much they gained from
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the perspective of the volunteers; the volunteers reported they had a “newfound respect” for the
professionalism and competence of city employees. For city employees, in particular, their
participation in the mayoral public-private partnerships served a liberating experience. These
“liberated” employees became the advocates of professional management at city hall and
informally created a city-wide network of internal change agents. This network of internal
employee-change agents seamlessly engineered the professionalization of the city’s work culture
from the bottom up.  For the outside volunteers, their participation in the mayoral public-private
partnerships had an educative effect. The volunteers were impressed by the dedication and
competence of city employees from whom they learned how Cleveland’s government really
works, and many developed permanent friendships with their city counterparts. Through this
educational experience, the volunteers deepened their affiliation with the city of Cleveland.
Three governance implications emerge from these lessons. The first implication is that a
public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency is not just for a newly elected
mayor facing a crisis. Both Mayors Voinovich and Jackson advocated using a public-private
partnership oriented toward operations efficiency on a regular basis. Mayor Voinovich (2014) felt
that Cleveland would benefit by renewing a public-private partnership oriented toward operations
efficiency every six years because “people get stale and their good habits disappear.” Similarly,
Mayor Jackson (2014) felt that the implementation of another OETF partnership would keep
people from “going back to their old ways” because “someone was watching.”  Apart from the
Hawthorne effect, a public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency can alert a
mayor to data processing problems and to the availability of new technology and software to
drive performance decisions.  Thus, a public-private partnership can help a city avoid getting
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dangerously behind on automation. Also, the cross-departmental relationships fostered in a
public-private partnership can help a mayor develop a comprehensive approach to service
delivery rather than to rely on a complaint-driven system that fragments administrative responses.
The second implication concerns the timing of a mayoral-led public-private partnership.
The implementation of a public-private partnership is easier politically for newly elected mayors
than for incumbent mayors.  Incumbent mayors may be reluctant to implement a needed public-
private partnership because they may not want to give the voters the impression that their
administrations are unstable. The perception of an unstable administration could erode their
chances for reelection. Thus, incumbent mayors should tailor their public-private partnership to
address a few priority issues, as Mayor Voinovich did in his follow-up to the OITF partnership.  
The third implication concerns citizen participation. Neither the Voinovich OITF
partnership nor the Jackson OETF partnership incorporated lay citizens.  The tendency in a
mayoral-led public-private partnership is to recruit outsiders who can bring specific expertise to
advise city employees.  However, there is value for a mayor to work with council members to
include lay citizens in a public-private partnership oriented toward operations improvement
because lay citizens are the true barometers of service quality.  As partnership members, lay
citizens can assess the status of service delivery in their neighborhoods, contribute to the design
of a public-private partnership’s change proposals, and evaluate service delivery improvements,
all from the perspective of the end users.
Conclusion
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This research paper analyzed the good government characteristics of the public-private
partnerships led by Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson in Cleveland.  Our research method
applied and extended the network theory of McGuire and Agranoff. We evaluated the Voinovich
and Jackson partnerships against the backdrop of five network (partnership) behaviors of 
activating, mobilizing, framing, synthesizing, and sustaining. These behaviors were general
categories that not only provided a complete inside picture of both mayoral-led partnerships but
enabled the discernment of their short- and long-term (transformational) results.  The sustained
effects of the Voinovich OITF public-private partnership transformed Cleveland into the
“comeback city” after the 1978  municipal default. The sustained effects of the Jackson OETF
public-private partnership positioned Cleveland as the “city of choice” in 2014.  In effect, both
mayoral-led public-private partnerships quietly transformed Cleveland’s government to meet the
demands of fewer resources, greater complexity, more transparency, and more timely decisions
in the delivery of public services to citizens.
Finally, it is important to note that no algorithm existed for designing a mayoral-led
public private partnership, even in the single setting of Cleveland. Consequently, the five
network (partnership) behaviors can guide a mayor in adapting a public-private partnership to fit
his or her leadership style, the environment of urban governance, and the urgent needs of
citizens. Furthermore, the findings from our application of network theory may serve as
propositions for future researchers to test. Empirical testing will deepen knowledge about the
transformational effects of a mayoral-led public-private partnership in municipal governance.
Endnotes
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1.  For information on the Voinovich OITF partnership, we interviewed Ben Bryan, the OITF
Implementation Coordinator, one departmental administrator, and one line manager.  For
information on the Jackson OETF partnership, we interviewed COO Darnell Brown, the OETF
Chair, and Michele Whitlow, the manager of the OETF Project Management Office (PMO). 
Additionally, we interviewed two city council presidents Martin Sweeney and Jay Westbrook. Of
the seven interviewees, two were involved both in the Voinovich OITF and the Jackson OETF
partnerships. All hour-long interviews, some in person and others by telephone, took place
between June and September 2014. 
2.  Mayor Voinovich (2013) modeled the Cleveland Operations Improvement Task Force (OITF)
on the successful public-private partnership that Governor Ronald Reagan implemented in
California with the assistance of Warren King and Associates. 
3.  Led by the Vice President of TRW, one team focused on the departments of public properties,
port control and public service.  Another team, led by an experienced FBI executive, headed the
Protective Services team, focusing on police, fire, and emergency management services.  Chaired
by a former Executive Vice President of Detroit Edison, the third team studied public utilities,
health, and community development. Led by an Ohio Bell Vice President, the fourth team
focused on general government, and its scope included the mayor’s office as well as the
departments of personnel and finance (OITF 1982).
4.  Comprising the CEO’s from forty-four major Cleveland-based corporations, Cleveland
Tomorrow also raised $855,000 for economic development projects to attract and retain
businesses in Greater Cleveland (Voinovich 2013).
5.  The participating suburban mayors were Republican Bruce Akers of Pepper Pike, Republican
Deborah Sutherland of Bay Village, and Democrat Martin Zanotti of Parma Heights. 
6.  Phase 1 Teams focused on the departments of Public Health, Building and Housing, Public
Service, and Parks, Recreation and Properties and the citywide services of IT service delivery,
human resources, procurement and purchasing, and customer service.  Concurrently, the
Department of Public Safety, which comprised 60 percent of the city’s budget, conducted an
internal assessment and identified fifty improvement opportunities for implementation. Also, the
Greater Cleveland Partnership funded loaned executives to assess the city’s fleet of motor
vehicles. Phase 2 Teams focused on the departments of Aging, City Planning, the Civil Service
Commission, Community Development, Consumer Affairs, Economic Development, Port
Control and Public Utilities, Cleveland Public Power (formerly Muny Light), Water and Water
Pollution Control.  Four additional teams focused on the general support functions provided by
the Departments of Finance and Law, as well as the Mayor’s Offices of Communications and
Equal Opportunity (OETF 2007). 
7.  This Cleveland Plan integrated the city’s network of charter schools into the Cleveland
municipal school district. In this way, Cleveland families living in neighborhoods with
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underachieving public school had access to high-quality options available for their children’s
education.  Then, in 2012, the mayor mobilized a bipartisan coalition comprising prominent
business and community leaders, teachers’ unions, teachers, parents, as well as key state and
county officials that secured legislation and a tax levy to sustain the innovative Cleveland Plan
(O’Donnell & Guillen 2012; Trickey 2013).  
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Table 1 - OITF Implementation Phases by Good Government Partnership Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich
OITF Phases/
Partnership
Behaviors
Activating
1979
Mobilizing
1980
Framing
1980
Synthesizing
1980-82
Sustaining
1982-89
OITF
Partnership
Concept
Formation 
*GV PPP premise
*Urgency - Default
*GV recruited by
business community
*Business support for
PPP premise & OITF
*GV elected mayor
*Overall Champion -GV
*External Champion - deWindt
*PPP Internal Champion -
Council President Forbes
*Support of Greater Cleveland
Roundtable
*OITF Goal
*Exec. Committee policy
objectives
*GV elimination of
patronage culture
*Legislative support of
City Council 
*Ongoing vital 
communication  between
public & private sectors 
OITF
Partnership
Development
*de Windt, Eaton Corp.
Chair & CEO
*OITF Executive
Committee
*Ways & Means
Committee
*Cleveland & Gund Foundation
Challenge Grants of $250,000
*deWindt & Mandel raised
$544,000 from 264 sponsors
* Ways & Means  set time
frames & formats
*Orientation & training by
Warren King
*GV memo to directors &
commissioners
OITF Coordinator moved
into Mayor’s office
*Working relationship
between the OITF
Coordinator & city
commissioners
* Cleveland Tomorrow 
* Community Capital
Investment Strategy &
Build Up Greater
Cleveland
*Downtown partnerships
OITF Partnership
Operations 
*Centralized & top-down
corporate governance
structure
*Operating Committee
* PPP Process Leaders: Warren
King & Govt Services Institute
*Internal Process Champion: 
Bryant, OITF Coordinator
*Financial Audit Task Force
*89 loaned executives for 12
weeks organized into four
 OITF study teams 
*Objectives: to reduce
expenses by 5-10% & find
productivity improvements
*Study teams produced
650 recommendations
*Dept. heads required to
write  OITF  plans &
evaluated on progress 
*Council passed 60 OITF
ordinances
*94% of OITF
implemented
*Saved $200 Million
*Workforce down 4%
*Default ended
*1982 charter changes
*14 additional study
teams formed & funded
*Improved labor and
police-community
relations
*Expanded network of
neighborhood organ.
OITF
Partnership
Follow-up
*Project MOVE
established
*Project MOVE Implementation
Coordinator managed 8,000
volunteers
*Culture shift to
professional management
*Original loaned
executives stayed
involved
*End of state fiscal
control in 1987
*Three All-America City
awards
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Table 2 - The OITF Partnership Structure (OITF 1982)
Executive Committee Job Title Company
E.M. De Windt, Chairman Chairman of the Board Eaton Corporation
Claude M. Blair, Vice President Chairman of the Board National City Corporation
Carole Hoover, Vice Chairman President Greater Cleveland Growth Association
Stanley C. Pace, Vice Chairman President TRW Inc.
Frederick K. Cox Vice-Chairman Ameritrust
Dr. Nolen M. Ellison District Chancellor Cuyahoga Community College
Fr. Marino Frascati Priest Our lady of Mt. Carmel Church
Robert E. Hunter Ret. Chairman of the Board & CEO Weatherhead Company
Joseph A. Kocab Vice President/Asst. Principal Czech Catholic Union/South High School
Sebastian Lupica Executive Secretary Cleveland AFL-CIO
Charles McDonald Chairman Council of Smaller Enterprises
Dr. Ruth Miller News Analyst WBBG Radio
John W. Hushen, coordinator Vice President-Corporate Affairs Eaton Corporation
Ways and Means Committee Job Title Company
E.M. De Windt Chairman of the Board Eaton Corporation
Claude M. Blair Chairman of the Board National City Corporation
Harry J. Bolwell Chairman and CEO Midland-Ross Corporation
John T. Collinson Chief Executive Officer Chessie System, Inc.
William H. De Lancey Chairman and CEO Republic Steel Corporation
John J. Dwyer President Oglebay Norton Company
George J. Grabner President and CEO The Lamson and Sessions Company
Robert D. Gries Founder and Managing Director Gries Investment Company
Ray J. Groves Chairman Ernst and Whinney
Roy H. Holdt Chief Executive Officer White Consolidated Industries, Inc.
Allen C. Holmes Managing Partner Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue
William E. MacDonald President and CEO The Ohio Bell Telephone Company
Morton L. Mandel co-founder and Chairman Premier Industrial Corporation
Charles McDonald Chairman Council of Smaller Enterprises
Arthur B. Modell Owner Cleveland Browns, Inc.
Stanley C. Pace President TRW Inc.
Patrick S. Parker President, Chairman and CEO Parker-Hannifin Corporation
Samuel K. Scovil President and CEO The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company
Herbert E. Strawbridge President The Higbee Company
Hays T. Watkins President and Co-CEO CSX
M. Brock Weir President Ameritrust
Alton W. Whitehouse, Jr. Chairman and CEO The Standard Oil Company (Ohio)
Operating Committee Job Title Company
Robert . Hunter, Chairman (1980) Ret. Chairman of the Board and CEO Weatherhead Company
Stanley S. Czarnecki Special Agent in Charge FBI
Robert W. Hartwell President Cliffs Electric Service Co.
James J. McGowan, Chairman (81-82) General Manager Ohio Bell Telephone Company
Gustav E. Schrader Vice President TRW, Inc.
43
Table 3 - OETF Implementation Phases by Good Government Partnership Behaviors of Mayor Jackson
OETF Phases/
Partnership
Behaviors
Activating
2006
Mobilizing
2006
Framing
2006-07
Synthesizing
2007-08
Sustaining
2009-14
OETF Partnership
Concept Formation’
*FJ became mayor
*Operations efficiency as
good govt model
*FJ Social equity mission
*Budget deficit
*Executive Sponsor- FJ
*PPP Champion -COO
Brown
*Suburban mayors
*OETF Charter
*Mayor’s annual budget
meeting with employees
*Fiscal discipline required
of dept. heads
*Transparent govt.
*Plain Dealer briefing
*Mayor’s Annual Report to
Citizens
*Cooperation with 
the business
community
*Cleveland K-12 
Plan
OETF Partnership
Development
 
*OEC Council
* Project Management
Office (PMO)
* Communication Team
*City Council as ally
*Union cooperation
*Diverse Volunteer
Recruitment:
*Process Leader: PMO
Manager Whitlow
*Councilman Westbrook on
OEC Council
*PMO Methodology
* Technical Training,
*Customer Service
Training
*Performance 
Measurement Training
*COO Management by
walking around
*City of Choice hotline &
email for employee input
*OETF Performance
Dashboards for Action
Teams
*CitiStat Initiated
*CitiStat &  3-1-1
systems  merged
*Citywide
performance
dashboards 
OETF
Operations
*Public sector driven
*Bottom-up, employee-
centered structure
*No outside funding
*406 OETF Participants
*24 Action Teams, co-
chaired by internal lead &
external lead (volunteer)
*Phase 1 - 8 teams
*Phase 2 - 16 teams
*Work Process Mapping &
Process Improvements
*Performance Targets
identified
*394 Recommendations
*94% implemented
*Saved $71 million
*Balanced budget
*Strategic IT Council 
* Q-O-L for citizens
*3-1-1 System
*Social equity initiatives
*Data-driven
performance
appraisals
*Cleveland
Management
Academy
*Career paths
OETF Partnership
Follow-up
*Sub-cabinet cluster:
revitalized neighborhoods &
created thriving  downtown
residential district
*Regional economic
development strategy
*Participation in NOCCA
*City employees as
internal champions
*Shift to a Performance
Culture of Customer
Service
*Citywide perspective 
*Inter-local agreements
*Regional cooperation
*Emerging Leaders
Cadre
*Brain Gain
*2014 Gay Games
*Won 2016
Republican Pres.
Nominating
Convention 
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Table 4 - The OETF Partnership Structure (OETF 2007, 2008)
Executive Sponsor Job Title Organization
Frank G. Jackson Mayor City of Cleveland
Operations Efficiency Council Job Title Organization
Darnell Brown, Chair Chief Operating Officer City of Cleveland
William M. Denihan Chief Executive Officer Cuyahoga County Community
 Mental Health Board
Lee Friedman President & Chief Executive Officer Cleveland Leadership Center
Fred Nance Managing Partner Squires, Sanders, & Dempsey LLP
Charles Phelps Director of Leadership Programs Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU
Dr. Vera Vogelsang-Coombs MPA Program Director Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU
Jay Westbrook Councilman, Ward 18 Cleveland City Council
Ron Woodford, PMP Senior Program Manager VW Group
Natoya J. Walker Special Assistant to  Mayor, Public Affairs City of Cleveland
Barry Withers Special Assistant to  Mayor, Employee
Services
City of Cleveland
Michele C. Whitlow OETF PMO Program Manager City of Cleveland
Dr. Melodie Mayberry-Stewart  (2006 ) Chief Technology Officer City of Cleveland
Communications Advisory Team Job Title Organization
Natoya J. Walker, Chair Special Assistant to  Mayor, Public Affairs City of Cleveland
Montrie Rucker Adams (2006-2007) President Visibility Marketing, Inc.
Carol Caruso (2006) Senior Vice President, Advocacy Greater Cleveland Partnership
Marie Galindo (2006) Owner Luchita's Restaurant
Wayne Hill, APR (2006) President Edward Howard & Co.
Mary Ann Sharkey (2006-2007) Chief Executive Officer Mita Marketing LLC
Tom Andrzejewski (2007) President Oppidan Group
Scott Osiecki (2007) Director, External Affairs Cuyahoga County Community 
Mental Health Board
Sheila Samuels (2007) Former Development Director Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU
Erica Chrysler (2006) Deputy Press Secretary City of Cleveland
Jason Wood (2006) Special Assistant to  Mayor, Boards &
Commissions
City of Cleveland
Michael House (2006-2007) General Manager, Channel 23 City of Cleveland
Francis Margaux (2007) Special Assistant to the Mayor City of Cleveland
Maureen Harper (2007) Chief of Communications City of Cleveland
Ossie Neal (2007) Marketing Manager, Division of Water
Pollution Control
City of Cleveland
OETF Project Management Office City of Cleveland Employees City of Cleveland Employees
Michele C. Whitlow, PMO Manager Gwen Bryant (2006-2007) Hollis Crump (2006-2007)
Eduardo Romero (2006) Shahid Sarawar (2006) Cynthia Sullivan (2006-2007)
Elaine Woods (2006-2007) Valencia Wright (2006-2007) Phyllis Fuller Clipps (2007)
Bertha Glover (2007) Ossie Neal (2007) Celeste Ribbins (2007)
Vinita Bose (2007) Tyeshia Minniefield (Intern) Jeremy Taylor (Intern)
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Figure 1 – The OETF Charter
Figure 1 - The OETF Charter
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